However, while the meaning of classical superpositions is usually obvious, that of quantum mechanical superpositions has to be determined. For example, the interpretation of a superposition dqe ipq |q as representing a state of momentum p can be derived from "quantization rules", valid for systems whose classical counterparts are known in their Hamiltonian form (see Sect. 2.2) . In other cases, an interpretation may be derived from the dynamics.
Dirac emphasized another (in his opinion even more important) difference: all non-vanishing components of (or projections from) a superposition are "in some sense contained" in it. This formulation seems to refer to an ensemble of physical states, which would imply that their description by formal "quantum states" is not complete. Another interpretation asserts that not the concept of quantum states, but rather the (Schrödinger) dynamics is incomplete. States found in measurements would then have to arise from an initial state by means of an indeterministic "collapse of the wave function". Both interpretations meet serious difficulties when applied consistently (see Sect. 2.3) .
In the third edition of his textbook, Dirac (1947) starts to explain the superposition principle by discussing one-particle states, which can be described by Schrödinger waves in three-dimensional space. This is an important application, although its similarity with classical waves may also be misleading. Wave functions derived from the quantization rules are defined on their classical configuration space, which happens to coincide with normal space only for a single mass point. Except for this limitation, the two-slit interference experiment, for example, (effectively a two-state superposition) is known to be very instructive. Dirac's second example, the superposition of two basic photon polarizations, no longer corresponds to a spatial wave. These two basic states "contain" all possible photon polarizations. The electron spin, another two-state system, exhausts the group SU(2) by a two-valued representation of spatial rotations, and it can be studied (with atoms or neutrons) by means of many variations of the SternGerlach experiment. In his lecture notes (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands 1965) , Feynman describes the maser mode of the ammonia molecule as another (very different) two-state system.
All these examples make essential use of superpositions of the kind |α = c 1 |1 + c 2 |2 , where the states |1 , |2 , and (all) |α can be observed as physically different states, and distinguished from one another in an appropriate setting. In the two-slit experiment, the states |1 and |2 represent the partial Schrödinger waves that pass through one or the other slit. Schrödinger's wave function can itself be understood as a consequence of the superposition principle by being viewed as the amplitudes ψ α (q) in the superposition of "classical" configurations q (now represented by corresponding quantum states |q or their narrow wave packets). In this case of a system with a known classical counterpart, these superpositions |α = dq ψ α (q)|q are assumed to define all quantum states. They may represent new observable properties (such as energy or angular momentum), which are not simply functions f (q), only as a nonlocal whole, but not as an integral over corresponding local densities (neither on space nor on configuration space). Since Schrödinger's wave function is thus defined on (in general highdimensional) configuration space, increasing its amplitude does not describe an increase of intensity or energy density, as it would for classical waves in three-dimensional space. Superpositions of the intuitive product states of composite systems may not only describe particle exchange symmetries (bosons and fermions); in the general case they lead to the fundamental concept of quantum nonlocality. The latter has to be distinguished from a mere extension in space (familiar from extended classical objects). For example, molecules in energy eigenstates are incompatible with their atoms being in definite quantum states themselves. Although the importance of this "entanglement" for many observable quantities (such as for the binding energy of the helium atom) had been well known, its consequence of violating Bell's inequalities (Bell 1964) seems to have surprised many physicists, since this result strictly excluded all local theories conceivably underlying quantum theory. However, quantum nonlocality appears paradoxical only when one attempts to interpret the wave function in terms of an ensemble of classical objects, such as "particles". If reality were defined to be local ("in space and time"), then it would indeed conflict with the empirical actuality of the wave function. Within the quantum formalism, entanglement also leads to decoherence, and in this way explains the classical appearance of the observed world in quantum terms. The application of this program is the main subject of this book (see also Zurek 1991 , Mensky 2000 , Tegmark and Wheeler 2001 , Zurek 2001 .
The predictive power of the superposition principle became particularly evident when it was applied in an ingenious step to postulate the existence of superpositions of states with different particle numbers (Jordan and Klein 1927) . Their meaning is illustrated, for example, by "coherent states" of different photon numbers, which may represent quasi-classical states of the electromagnetic field (cf. Glauber 1963) . Such dynamically arising (and in many cases experimentally confirmed) superpositions are often misinterpreted as merely representing probability amplitudes for the occurrence of "real" states (here assumed to possess a definite particle number). This would be as mistaken as replacing a hydrogen wave function by the probability distribution p(r) = |ψ(r)| 2 , or an entangled state by an ensemble of product states (or a two-point function). A superposition is in general observably different from an ensemble consisting of its components with corresponding probabilities.
Another spectacular success of the superposition principle was the prediction of new particles formed as superpositions of K-mesons and their antiparticles (Gell-Mann and Pais 1955, Lee and Yang 1956) . A similar model is used to describe "neutrino oscillations" (Wolfenstein 1978) .
The superposition principle can also be successfully applied to states that may be generated by means of symmetry transformations from asymmetric ones. In classical mechanics, a symmetric Hamiltonian means that each asymmetric solution (such as an elliptical Kepler orbit) implies other solutions, obtained by applying the symmetry transformations (e.g. rotations). Quantum theory requires in addition that all their superpositions also form solutions (cf. Wigner 1964 , or Gross 1995 see also Sect. 9.6) . A complete set of energy eigenstates can then be constructed by means of irreducible linear representations of the dynamical symmetry group. Among them are usually symmetric solutions (such as s-waves in the hydrogen atom) that need not have a counterpart in classical mechanics.
A great number of novel applications of the superpositon principle have been studied experimentally or theoretically during recent years. For example, superpositions of different "classical" states of laser modes ("mesoscopic Schrödinger cats") could be prepared (Monroe et al. 1996) , the entanglement of photon pairs has been confirmed to persist over tens of kilometers (Tittel et al. 1998) , and interference experiments with fullerene molecules have been successfully performed (Arndt et al. 1999) . SQUIDs represent an even more macroscopic candidate for exhibiting quantum phenoma. Quantum computers, now under intense investigation, would have to perform different ("parallel") calculations while forming one superposition that may later be used for interference. So-called quantum teleportation requires the advanced preparation of an entangled state of distant systems. One of its components may then later be selected by a local measurement in order to determine the state of the distant system. Whenever an experiment was technically feasible, all components of a superposition have been shown to act coherently, thus proving that they exist simultaneously. It is surprising that many physicists seem to regard superpositions as a secondary concept, which merely represents some state of ignorance (possibly caused by stochastic "events"). There now appears to remain but a minor step to discuss even the meaning of conceivable (though hardly realizable) interference experiments with a conscious observer. Would he have one or many "minds" (being aware of his path)?
The most general quantum states seem to be superpositions of different classical fields on three-or higher-dimensional space. In a perturbation expansion in terms of free "particles" (wave modes) this leads to expansion terms corresponding to Feynman diagrams, as shown long ago by Dyson (1949) . The path integral describes a superposition of paths, that is, the propagation of wave functionals according to a generalized Schrödinger equation, while the individual paths under the integral have no physical meaning by themselves. Wave functions will here always be understood in this generalized sense of wave functionals if required.
One has to keep in mind this universality of the superposition principle in order to appreciate the meaning of the concept of decoherence.
Superselection Rules
In spite of this success of the superposition principle it soon became evident that not all conceivable superpositions are found in Nature. This led some physicists to postulate "superselection rules", which restrict this principle by axiomatically excluding certain superpositions (Wick, Wightman, and Wigner 1970, Streater and Wightman 1964) . There are also attempts to derive some of these superselection rules from other principles, which can be postulated in quantum field theory (see Chaps. 6 and 7). However, in general these principles merely exclude "unwanted" consequences of a general superposition principle by hand.
Most disturbing in this sense seem to be superpositions of states with integer and half-integer spin (bosons and fermions). They would destroy the invariance of physical properties under 2π-rotations (see Sect. 6.2), although the violation of this invariance of physical states has received direct support from experiments (Rauch et al. 1975) . Another supposedly "fundamental" superselection rule seems to disallow superpositions of different charge. For example, superpositions of a proton and a neutron have never been directly observed, although they occur formally in the isotopic spin formalism. This intrinsic symmetry group was later successfully generalized to the group SU(3) in order to characterize other intrinsic degrees of freedom. The theory of supersymmetry (Wess and Zumino 1971) requires even formal superpositions of bosons and fermions. On the other hand, superpositions of protons and neutrons "exist" within nuclei, where isospin-dependent selfconsistent potentials may arise from an intrinsic symmetry breaking. Similarly, superpositions of different charge form the basis of BCS states (Bardeen, Cooper, and Schrieffer, 1957) . They describe successfully the intrinsic properties of superconductors and related many-particle systems, although a definite charge value has to be projected out in these cases in order to represent the physical state of the total system (see Sect. 9.6).
Other limitations of the superposition principle are less clearly defined. While elementary particles are described by means of wave functions (that is, superpositions of different positions), the moon seems always to be at a definite place, and a cat seems to be either dead or alive. A general superposition principle would even allow superpositions of a cat and a dog (as suggested by Joos). In the Copenhagen interpretation, this difference is attributed to a strict conceptual separation between the microscopic and the macroscopic world. However, where is the border line that distinguishes an n-particle state of quantum mechanics from an N-particle state that is classical? Where, precisely, does the superposition principle break down?
Chemists do indeed know that a border line seems to exist deep in the microscopic world (Primas 1981 , Woolley 1986 . For example, most molecules (save the smallest ones) are found with their nuclei at definite positions (with relative positions forming static or oscillating "configurations"), but hardly ever in superpositions thereof, as it would be required for energy or angular momentum eigenstates. The latter are observed for hydrogen and other small molecules. Even chiral states of a sugar molecule appear "classical", in contrast to parity and energy eigenstates, which correctly describe the otherwise analogous maser mode states of the ammonia molecule (see Sect. 3.2.4 for details). Does this difference mean that quantum mechanics breaks down already for very small particle number?
Certainly not in general, since there are well established superpositions of many-particle states: phonons in solids, superfluids, squids, white dwarf stars and many more! All properties of macroscopic bodies which can be calculated quantitatively are consistent with quantum mechanics, but not with any classical description. As will be demonstrated throughout the book, the theory of decoherence is able to explain the apparent differences between the quantum and the classical world under the assumption of a universally valid quantum theory.
An attempt to derive the absence of certain superpositions from (exact or approximate) conservation laws which forbid or suppress transitions between their corresponding components would be insufficient. This "traditional" explanation (which seems to be the origin of the name "superselection rule") was used, for example, by Hund (1927) in his arguments given in favor of the chiral states of molecules. However, small or vanishing transition rates require in addition that superpositions were absent initially for all these molecules (or their constituents from which they formed). Similarly, charge conservation does not explain the charge superselection rule! Negligible wave packet dispersion (valid for large mass) may prevent initially presumed wave packets from growing wider, but this initial condition is quantitatively insufficient to explain the quasi-classical appearance of mesoscopic objects, such as small dust grains or large molecules (see Sect. 3.2.1), or even that of celestial bodies in chaotic motion (Zurek and Paz 1994) . Furthermore, initial conditions for conserved quantities would in general allow one only to exclude global superpositions, but not local ones (Giulini, Kiefer and Zeh 1995) .
How can these superselection rules be understood?
Decoherence by "Measurements"
Other experiments with quantum objects have taught us that interference, for example between partial waves, disappears if the property corresponding to the partial waves is determined by measurement. Such partial waves may describe the passage through various slits of an interference device, or the two beams of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus ("Welcher Weg experiments"). This loss of coherence is indeed required by mere logic once measurements are assumed to lead to definite results. In this case, the frequencies of events on the detection screen measured in coincidence with a certain passage can be counted separately, and thus have to be added to define the total probabilities. 2 It is therefore a plausible observation that the interference disappears also when the passage is "measured" without registration of the result. The latter may be assumed to have become a "classical fact" (even if unknown) as soon the measurement has irreversibly occurred. This consequence is circumscribed by the statement that observable quantum properties enter existence in an irreversible act of measurement (in contrast to Heisenberg's early idealistic interpretation that referred to human observation). However, what presicely is a measurement in terms of the formalism?
Dynamical analysis within the quantum mechanical formalism demonstrates that the essential condition for this "decoherence" is that complete information about the passage is carried away in some physical form , Mensky 1979 , Zurek 1981 , Caldeira and Leggett 1983 , Joos and Zeh 1985 . "Information" here means that the quantum state of the "environment", which carries the information, is unambiguously correlated with the chosen passage (or measured property), that is, with the partial wave representing it (similarly to a pointer position which depends on the quantity that it has measured). This need not happen in a controllable form; the information may as well be transformed into noise. However, in contrast to statistical correlations, quantum correlation is part of individual entangled superpositions (nonlocal physical states). Entanglement defines physical properties (such as total spin) even over larg distances. Therefore, one cannot understand entanglement as (a new form of) "information" (cf. Brukner and Zeilinger 2000) . Rather, this terminology would mislead to the popular misappropriation of the collapse as a "mere increase of information" (which requires an ensemble).
When is unambiguous information carried away? If a macroscopic object had the opportunity of passing through two slits, we would always be able to convince ourselves of its choice of a path by simply opening our eyes in order to "look". This means that in this case there is plenty of light that contains information about the path (even in a controllable manner). Interference does not occur, since the path is evidently "continuously measured" by light. The common textbook argument that the interference pattern of macroscopic objects be too fine to be observable is entirely irrelevant. However, would it then not be sufficient to dim the light completely in order to re-discover a quantum mechanical interference pattern for macroscopic objects?
This could be investigated in principle by means of more sophisticated experiments (see Brune et al. 1996 for a mesocsopic case). However, in order to precisely determine the subtle limit where measurement by the environment becomes negligible, it is more economic first to apply the theory which is known to describe such experiments. Thereby we have to take into account the quantum nature of the information medium, as discussed long ago by Brillouin (1962) . This can usually be done easily, since the quantum theory of interacting systems, such as the quantum theory of particle scattering, is well understood. Its application to decoherence requires that one averages over all unobserved degrees of freedom. In technical terms, one has to "trace out the environment" after it has interacted with the considered system. This procedure leads to a quantitative theory of decoherence. Taking the trace is based on the probability interpretation applied to the environment (averaging over all possible outcomes of measurements), even though the latter is not measured. (The physical meaning of the required technical concepts will be discussed in Sect. 2.4.)
Is it possible in this way to explain all superselection rules as an effect of the environment -including the existence and position of the border line between microscopic and macroscopic behaviour in the realm of molecules? This would mean that the universality of the superposition principle could be maintained -as is indeed the basic idea of the program of decoherence , Zurek 1982 ; see also Chap. 4 of Zeh 2001) . For example, two states of different charge interact very differently with the electromagnetic field even in the absence of radiation: their Coulomb fields carry complete information about the charge at any distance. The quantum state of this field would thus decohere a superposition of different charges if regarded as a quantum system in a bounded region of space (Giulini, Kiefer, and Zeh 1995) . This "instantaneous" action of decoherence at an arbitrary distance by means of the Coulomb field gives it the appearance of a kinematical effect, although it is based on the dynamical law of charge conservation (see Sect. 6.4).
There are many other cases where the unavoidable effect of decoherence can easily be imagined without any calculation. For example, superpositions of macroscopically different electromagnetic fields f (r) may be described by a field functional Ψ [f (r)]. However, any charged particle in a sufficiently narrow wave packet would then evolve into different packets, and thus be entangled with the state of the quantum field (Kübler and Zeh 1973 , Kiefer 1992 , Zurek, Habib, and Paz 1993 ; see also Sect. 4.1.2). The particle can be said to "measure" the quantum state of the field. Since charged particles are in general abundant in the environment, no superpositions of macroscopically different fields (or different "mean fields") are observed under normal conditions. This result is related to the difficulty of preparing and maintaining "squeezed states" of light (Yuen 1976 ) -see Sect. 3.3.3.1. Therefore, the field appears to be in one of its classical states (Sect. 4.1.2).
In all cases, this requires that the quasi-classical states (or "pointer states") are robust (dynamically stable) under natural decoherence, as pointed out in the first paper on decoherence ; see also Diósi and Kiefer 2000) .
A particularly important example of quasiclassical fields is the metric of general relativity (with classical states described by spatial geometries on spacelike hypersurfaces -see Sect. 4.2). Decoherence caused by all kinds of matter can therefore explain the absence of superpositions of macroscopically distinct spatial curvatures (Joos 1986 , Zeh 1986 , 1988 , Kiefer 1987 , while microscopic superpositions would describe hardly ever observable gravitons.
Superselection rules thus arise as a straightforward consequence of quantum theory under realistic assumptions. They have nonetheless been discussed mainly in mathematical physics -apparently under the influence of von Neumann's and Wigner's "orthodox" interpretation of quantum mechanics (see Wightman 1995 for a review). Decoherence by "continuous measurement" seems to form the most fundamental irreversible process in Nature. It applies even where thermodynamical concepts do not (such as for individual molecules -see Sect. 3.2.4), or when any exchange of heat is absolutely negligible. Its time arrow of "microscopic causality" requires a Sommerfeld radiation condition for microscopic scattering (similar to Boltzmann's chaos), viz., the absence of any dynamically relevant initial correlations, which would define a "conspiracy" in common terminology Zeh 1985, Zeh 2001 ).
Observables as a Derived Concept
Measurements are usually described by means of "observables", formally represented by Hermitian operators, and introduced in addition to the concepts of quantum states and their dynamics as a fundamental and independent ingredient of quantum theory. However, even though often forming the starting point of the formal quantization procedure, this ingredient does not seem to be separately required. This view, to be explained below, complies with John Bell's quest for the replacement of observables with "beables" (see . It was for this reason that his preference shifted from Bohm's theory to collapse models (where wave functions are assumed to completely describe reality) during his last years.
Let |α be an arbitrary quantum state, defined operationally (up to a complex numerical factor) by a "complete preparation" procedure. The phenomenological probability for finding the system during an appropriate measurement in another quantum state |n , say, is given by means of their inner product as p n = | n | α | 2 (where both states are assumed to be normalized). The state |n is here defined by the specific measurement. (In a position measurement, for example, the number n has to be replaced with the continuous coordinates x, y, z, leading to the "improper" Hilbert states |r .) For measurements of the "first kind" (to which all others can be approximately reduced -see Sect. 2.3), the system will again be found in the state |n with certainty if the measurement is immediately repeated. Preparations can be considered as measurements which select a certain subset of outcomes for further measurements. n-preparations are therefore also called n-filters, since all "not-n" results are thereby excluded from the subsequent experiment proper. The above probabilities can also be written in the form p n = α | P n | α , with an "observable" P n := |n n|, which is thus derived from the kinematical concept of quantum states.
Instead of such special "n or not-n measurements", one can also perform more general "n 1 or n 2 or . . . measurements", with all n i 's mutually exclusive ( n i | n j = δ ij ). If the states forming such a set {|n } are pure and exhaustive (that is, complete, P n = 1l), they represent a basis of the corresponding Hilbert space. By introducing an arbitrary "measurement scale" a n , one may introduce general observables A = |n a n n|, which permit the definition of "expectation values" α | A | α = p n a n . (In the special case of a yes-no measurement, one has a n = δ nn0 , and expectation values become probabilities.) Finding the state |n during a measurement is then also expressed as "finding the value a n of an observable". A change of scale, b n = f (a n ), describes the same physical measurement; for position measurements of a particle it would simply represent a coordinate transformation. Even a measurement of the value its potential energy would be equivalent to a position measurement (up to degeneracy) if the functional form V (r) were given. Accordingly, quantum expectation values must not be understood as describing mean values in an ensemble that represents ignorance. They have to be interpreted as probabilities with respect to the potentially arising quantum states |n -regardless of the latters' interpretation. If the set {|n } of such potential states forms a basis, any state |α can be represented as a superposition |α = c n |n . In general, it neither forms an n 0 -state nor any not-n 0 state. Its dependence on the complex coefficients c n means that states which differ from one another by a numerical factor must be assumed to be different states. This is true even though they represent the same "ray" in Hilbert space and cannot, according to the measurement postulate, be distinguished operationally. The states |n 1 +|n 2 and |n 1 − |n 2 could not be physically different if |n 2 and −|n 2 were the same quantum state. (Only a global numerical factor would be "redundant" in the sense of Sect. 6.3.) For this reason, projection operators |n n| are insufficient to characterize quantum states completely (cf. also Mirman 1970) .
The expansion coefficients c n connecting physically meaningful states, for example those describing different spin directions or different versions of the Kmeson, must in principle be determined (relative to one another) by appropriate experiments. However, they can often be derived from a previously known (or conjectured) classical theory by means of "quantization rules". In this case, the classical configurations q are postulated to parametrize a basis in Hilbert space, {|q }, while the canonical momenta p parametrize another one, {|p }. Their corresponding observables, Q = dq || and P = dp |p p p|, are required to obey commutation relations in analogy to the classical Poisson brackets. In this way, they form an important tool for constructing and interpreting the specific Hilbert space of quantum states. These commutators essentially determine the relating unitary transformation p | q , for example as a Fourier transform e ipq , -thus more than what is defined by the corresponding projectors. This algebraic procedure is mathematically very elegant and appealing, since the Poisson brackets and commutators may represent generalized symmetry transformations. However, the concept of observables (which form the algebra) can be derived from the more fundamental one of state vectors and their inner products, as described above.
Physical states are assumed to vary with time in accordance with a dynamical law -in quantum mechanics of the form i∂ t |α = H|α . In contrast, a measurement device is usually defined regardless of time. This must then also hold for the observable representing it, or for its eigenbasis {|n }. The probabilities p n (t) = | n | α(t) | 2 will therefore vary with time according to the timedependence of the physical states |α . It is well known that this (Schrödinger) time dependence is formally equivalent to the (inverse) time dependence of observables (or the reference states |n ). Since observables "correspond" to classical variables, this time dependence appeared suggestive in the Heisenberg-BornJordan algebraic approach to quantum theory. However, the absence of dynamical states, a consequence of the insisting on classical kinematical concepts, leads to paradoxes and conceptual inconsistencies (complementarity, dualism, quantum logic, quantum information, and all that).
An environment-induced superselection rule means that certain superpositions are highly unstable with respect to decoherence. It is then impossible in practice to construct measurement devices for them. This empirical situation has led some physicists to deny the existence of these superpositions and their corresponding observables -either by postulate or by formal manipulations of dubious interpretation, often including infinities. In an attempt to circumvent the measurement problem (that will be discussed in the following section), they often simply regard such superpositions as "mixtures" once they have formed according to the Schrödinger equation (cf. Primas 1990) .
While any basis in Hilbert space {|n } defines formal probabilities, p n = | n | α | 2 , only a basis consisting of states that are not immediately destroyed by decoherence defines a practically "realizable observable". Since realizable observables usually form a genuine subset of all formal observables (diagonalizable operators), they must contain a nontrivial "center" in algebraic terms. It consists of those of them which commute with all the rest. Observables forming the center may be regarded as "classical", since they can be measured simultaneously with all realizable ones. In the algebraic approach to quantum theory, this center appears as part of its axiomatic structure (Jauch 1968). However, since the condition of decoherence has to be considered quantitatively (and may even vary to some extent with the specific nature of the environment), this algebraic classification remains an approximate and dynamically emerging scheme.
These "classical" observables thus define the subspaces into which superpositions decohere. Hence, even if the superposition of a right-handed and a left-handed chiral molecule, say, could be prepared by means of an appropriate (very fast) measurement of the first kind, for example, it would be destroyed before the measurement could be repeated for a test. In contrast, the chiral states of all individual molecules in a bag of sugar are "robust" in a normal environment, and thus individually retain this property for time intervals which by far exceed thermal relaxation times. This stability is even increased by the quantum Zeno effect (Sect. 3.3.1). Therefore, chirality appears not only classical, but also as an approximate constant of the motion that has to be taken into account in the definition of thermodynamical ensembles (see Sect. 2.3).
The description of measurements (of the first kind) by means of probabilities for transitions |α → |n , used so far, (or, for that matter, by corresponding observables) is phenomenological. However, measurements should be described as interactions between the measured system and the measurement device. The observable (that is, the measurement basis) has to be derived from the corresponding interaction Hamiltonian and the initial state of the device. As discussed by von Neumann (1932) , this interaction must be diagonal with respect to the measurement basis (see also Zurek 1981) . Its diagonal matrix elements are operators that act on the quantum state of the device in a manner that, when integrated in time, brings its "pointer" into a position appropriate for being read, |n |Φ 0 → |n |Φ n . Here, the first ket refers to the system, the second one to the device. The states |Φ n , representing different pointer positions, must approximately be mutually orthogonal, and "classical" in the sense of above.
Because of the dynamical superposition principle, an initial superposition c n |n does not lead to definite pointer positions (with their empirically observed frequencies). If decoherence is neglected, one obtains their entangled superposition c n |n |Φ n , that is, a state that is different from all potential measurement outcomes |n |Φ n . This dilemma represents the "quantum measurement problem" (Sect. 2.3). Von Neumann's interaction has nonetheless usually been regarded as the first step of a measurement (a "premeasurement"). Yet, a collapse seems to be required -now apparently in the measurement device rather than in the microscopic system. Because of the entanglement between system and apparatus, it must then affect the total system.
3
If, in a measurement, a whole subset of states |n leads to identical pointer positions, these states would not be distinguished. After such an "incomplete" measurement, one and the same pointer state |Φ n is correlated with the projection of the original state of the measured system, c n |n , on the subspace spanned by the subset. This was indeed postulated axiomatically by Lüders (1951) in his generalization of von Neumann's "first intervention" (Sect. 2.3).
In this sense, the interaction with an appropriate measuring device defines an observable up to arbitrary monotoneous scale transformations. The time dependence of observables according to the Heisenberg picture would thus describe an imaginary time dependence of this device (its pointer states), paradoxically controlled by the intrinsic Hamiltonian of the system.
The question of decoherence, hence that of the physical realizability of a formal observable, can only be answered by quantitatively taking into account the normal environment of the system, while the macroscopic pointer is always asssumed to decohere. However, environment-induced decoherence by itself does not solve the measurement problem, since the "pointer states" |Φ n may be assumed to include the total environment (the "rest of the world"). Identifying the thereby arising global superposition with an ensemble of states (represented by a statistical operator ρ) that leads to the same expectation values A = tr(Aρ) for a limited set of observables {A} (such as local ones, or those characterizing the subsystem) would obviously beg the question. This kind of argument is nonetheless found wide-spread in the literature (cf. Haag 1992) . It would be equivalent to a quantum mechanical state space smaller than required by a general superposition principle, and incompatible with a universal Schrödinger equation.
In Sect. 2.4, statistical operators ρ will be derived from the concept of quantum states as a tool for calculating expectation values, that is, probabilities for the occurrence of other states during measurements. In the Heisenberg picture they are often regarded as in some sense representing ensembles of "values" for the observables, which are postulated to replace the classical variables formally. This interpretation is suggested by their (incomplete) formal analogy to classical phase space distributions. However, such "values" would be physically meaningful only if they characterized certain physical states (such as pointer positions). Note that Heisenberg's uncertainty relations refer to potential values which may be found in different measurements; there is no uncertainty of (global) quantum states (except by their ignorance).
The Measurement Problem
The superposition of different measurement outcomes, resulting from the Schrö-dinger equation as discussed above, demonstrates that a "naive ensemble interpretation" of quantum mechanics is ruled out. It would mean that a quantum state (such as c n |n |Φ n ) represents an ensemble of some as yet unspecified fundamental states, of which a subensemble (such as the one represented by the quantum state |n |Φ n ) could be "picked out by a mere increase of information". If this were true, then the subensemble resulting from this measurement could in principle be traced back in time in accordance with the Schrödinger equation in order to determine also the initial state more completely (to "postselect" it -see Aharonov and Vaidman 1991) . However, in the above case this would lead to the initial quantum state |n |Φ 0 that is physically different from the superposition ( c n |n )|Φ 0 that had been prepared (whatever it means).
In spite of this simple argument, which demonstrates that an ensemble interpretation would require a complicated and miraculous nonlocal "background mechanism" in order to work consistently (cf. Footnote 2 regarding Bohm's theory), the ensemble interpretation of the wave function seems to remain the most popular one because of its (albeit definitely limited) pragmatic value when used naively. (A more rigorous critical discussion of this situation may be found in d 'Espagnat 1976 'Espagnat , 1995 A way out of this dilemma in terms of the wave function itself requires one of the following two possibilities: (1) a modification of the Schrödinger equation that explicitly describes a collapse (also called "spontaneous localization" -see Chap. 8), or (2) an Everett type interpretation, in which all measurement outcomes are assumed to coexist in one formal superposition, but to be perceived separately as a consequence of their dynamical decoupling due to decoherence. While this latter suggestion may appear "extravagant" (as it requires myriads of coexisting parallel quasi-classical "worlds"), it is similar in principle to the conventional (though nontrivial) assumption made tacitly in all classical descriptions of observations that consciousness is localized in certain (semi-stable and suffiently complex) spatial subsystems of the world (such as human brains or parts thereof). For a dispute about which of these two possibilities should be preferred, the fact that environmental decoherence readily describes precisely the apparently occurring "quantum jumps" or "collapse events" (as will be discussed in great detail throughout this book) appears utterly important.
The dynamical rules which are (explicitly or tacitly) used to describe the effective time dependence of quantum states thus represent a "dynamical dualism". This was first clearly formulated by von Neumann (1932) , who distinguished between the unitary evolution according to the Schrödinger equation (remarkably his "zweiter Eingriff" or "second intervention"),
valid for isolated (absolutely closed) systems, and the "reduction" or "collapse of the wave function", |ψ = c n |n −→ |n 0 (2.1b) (remarkably his "first intervention"). The latter was to describe the stochastic transitions into the new state |n 0 during measurements. Their dynamical discontinuities had been anticipated by Bohr in the form of "quantum jumps" between his discrete electron orbits. Later, the time-dependent Schrödinger equation (2.1a) for interacting systems was often regarded merely as a method of calculating probabilities for similar (individually unpredictable) discontinuous transitions between energy eigenstates (stationary quantum states) of atomic systems (Born 1926) .
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In scattering theory, one usually probes only part of quantum mechanics by restricting consideration to asymptotic states and their probabilities (disregarding their superpositions). All quantum correlations between them then appear statistical ("classical"). Occasionally even the unitary dynamical transition or scattering amplitudes m out |n in = m| S |n are confused with probability amplitudes m ′ |n , which describe measurements. This dynamical dualism was evidently the motivation for an ignorance interpretation of the wave function, which attempts to explain the collapse not as a dynamical process in the system, but as an increase of information about it (the reduction of an ensemble of possible states). However, even though the dynamics of ensembles in classical description uses a formally similar dualism, an analogous interpretation in quantum theory leads to the severe (and evidently fatal) difficulties indicated above. They are often circumvented by the invention of "new rules of logic and statistics", which are not based on any physical interpretation of information. During the first step of the figure, the state of the observer changes depending on that of the system. The second step depicts a subsequent reset, required if the measurement is to be repreated with the same device (Bennett 1973 
B
′ are their effects in the thermal environment, required for a deterministic reset. The "physical entropy" (defined to add for subsystems) measures the phase space of all microscopic degrees of freedom, including the property to be measured. Because of its presumed additivity, the physical entropy neglects all statistical correlations (dashed lines, which indicate sums of products of sets) for being "irrelevant" in the futurehence S physical ≥ S ensemble . I is the amount of information held by the observer. The initial entropy S 0 is at least k ln 2 in this simple case of two equally probable values a and b.
If the state of a classical system is incompletely known, and the corresponding point p,q in phase space therefore replaced by an ensemble (a probability distribution) ρ(p, q), this ensemble can be "reduced" by a new observation that leads to an increase of information. For this purpose, the system must interact in a controllable manner with the "observer" who holds the information (cf. Szilard 1929) . His state of memory or consciousness must thereby change in dependence on the property-to-be-measured of the observed system, leaving the latter unchanged in the ideal case (no "recoil"). According to deterministic dynamical laws, the ensemble entropy of the combined system, which initially contains the entropy corresponding to the unknown microscopic quantity, would remain constant if it finally contained the entropy characterizing the ensemble of different outcomes. However, since the observer is assumed to "know" (to be aware of) his own state, the ensemble has to be reduced correspondingly, and the ensemble entropy with respect to his state of information is lowered. This is depicted by the first step of Fig. 2 .1, where ensembles of states are represented by areas. In contrast to many descriptions of Maxwell's demon, the observer (regarded as a device) is here subsumed into the ensemble description. Physical entropy, unlike ensemble entropy, is usually understood as a local concept, which neglects long range correlations for being "irrelevant", and thus defines a corresponding entropy density. The information I, given in the figure, measures the reduction of entropy according to the increased knowledge of the observer.
This description does not necessarily require a conscious observer (although it may ultimately rely upon him). It applies to any macroscopic measurement device, since physical entropy is not only defined to be local, but also relative to "given" macroscopic properties (as a function of them). The dynamical part of the measurement transforms "physical" entropy (here the ensemble entropy of the microscopic variables) deterministically into entropy of lacking information about controllable macroscopic properties. Before the observation is taken into account (that is, before the "or" is applied), both halves of the figure after the first step contribute to the ensemble entropy. If it is taken into account (as done by the numbers given in the figure), the ensemble entropy is reduced according to the corresponding information gain of the observer.
Any registration of information by the observer must use up his memory capacity ("blank paper"), that is, an initially free entropy reservoir, for example in his brain. If the same measurement is to be repeated, for example in a cyclic process that is used to transform heat into mechanical energy by using this information (Szilard, l.c.) , an equivalent amount of entropy must be emitted into the environment in order to reset the measurement or registration device (second step of Fig. 2.1 ): two different states cannot deterministically evolve into the same final state (Bennett 1973) .
5 This is usually done in the form of heat again. In order to avoid a reset, new memory capacity ("order") would have to be used up or created by another dissipative process (as required for a human observer in his natural environment). In this case of accumulating information, the first "or" could remain in effect during a second measurement. This whole description is based on an arrow of time which requires that all correlations possess local causes in their past (no "conspiracy"). The irreversible formation of "irrelevant" correlations then explains the increase of physical (local) entropy, while the ensemble entropy is conserved. 5 Bennett does not include the entropy representing the microscopic ensemble a/b in his physical entropy -presumably because this variable is assumed to be dynamically stable, in contrast to the "thermal" (ergodic or uncontrollable) property A ′ /B ′ . The difficulties encountered in an ensemble interpretation of the wave function (or of any other superposition |a + |b ) are caused by the fact that there is no ensemble entropy that would represent the unknown property-to-be-measured (see the first step of Fig. 2 .2 or 2.3 -cf. also Zurek 1984) . The "ensemble entropy" is now defined by the "corresponding" expression S ensemble = −k tr{ρ ln ρ} (but see Sect. 2.4 for the interpretation of the density matrix ρ). If the entropy of the observer and the environment are the same as in the classical case, the total initial ensemble entropy is now lower; in the case of equal initial probabilities it is S qm 0 = S class 0 − k ln 2. It would even vanish for pure states of the observer and environment, (|a + |b )|φ 0 |χ 0 . The Schrödinger evolution (depicted in Fig. 2. 3) would then be described by the dynamical process (|a + |b )|φ 0 |χ 0 → (|a |φ A + |b |φ B )|χ 0 → |a |φ A |χ A ′′ + |b |φ B |χ B ′′ → (|a |χ A ′ A ′′ + |b |χ B ′ B ′′ )|φ 0 , with an "irrelevant" (inaccessible) final quantum correlation between system and environment as a relic from the initial superposition. In this unitary evolution, the reset appears as an "irrelevant revival" of the superposition: two "branches" recombine to form an uncontrollable nonlocal superposition. Its local unobservability characterizes an "apparent collapse" (that will be discussed). For a genuine collapse (Fig. 2. 2), the final correlation is statistical, and the ensemble entropy increases.
As mentioned in Sect. 2.2, the general interaction dynamics that is required to describe "ideal" measurements according to the Schrödinger equation is derived from the special case where the measured system is prepared in an eigenstate |n before measurement (von Neumann 1932),
Here, |n corresponds to |a or |b in the figures, the pointer positions |Φ n to the states |φ A and |φ B . (During non-ideal measurements the state |n may change, too.) However, applied to an initial superposition, c n |n , the interaction according to (2.1a) leads to an entangled superposition,
As emphasized above, the resulting superposition represents a global state that is physically different from all components appearing in this sum. While decoherence arguments tell us (see Chap. 3) that neglecting the environment would be absolutely unrealistic if |Φ n represents the pointer state of a macroscopic apparatus, the objection remains nonetheless valid if this state is instead defined to include the "rest of the universe", such as |Φ n = |φ n |χ n . This powerful argument holds regardless of all complications, such as decoherence and other practically irreversible processes (which need not even be known). Therefore, it does seem that the measurement problem can only be resolved if the Schrödinger dynamics (2.1a) is supplemented by a nonunitary collapse (2.1b). Specific proposals for such a process will be discussed in Chap. 8. Remarkably, however, there is no empirical evidence yet on where the Schrödinger equation may have to be modified for this purpose (see Joos 1986 , Pearle and Squires 1994 , or d'Espagnat 2001 . On the contrary, the dynamical superposition principle has been confirmed with phantastic accuracy in spin systems (Weinberg 1989 , Bollinger et al. 1989 .
The Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory insists that the measurement outcome has to be described in fundamental classical terms rather than as a quantum state. While according to Pauli (in a letter to Einstein : Born 1969) , the appearance of an electron position (or the value of any other microscopic observable) is "a creation outside of the laws of Nature" (eine ausserhalb der Naturgesetze stehende Schöpfung), Ulfbeck and Bohr (2001) now claim (similar to Ludwig 1990 in his attempts to derive "the" Copenhagen interpretation from fundamental principles) that the click in the counter appears "out of the blue", and without being caused by a decay event that would occur in the atom, for example. Together with the occurrence of this not dynamically analyzable irreversible event in the counter, the wave function is then claimed to "loose its meaning" (precisely where it would otherwise describe decoherence!). The Copenhagen interpretation is hailed by many physicists as the greatest revolution in physics, as it seems to rule out the general validity of a concept of objective physical reality. I am instead inclined to regard it as a kind of "quantum voodoo": words instead of concepts. The theory of decoherence describes this event in the counter by means of a universal Schrödinger equation as a fast and for all practical purposes irreversible dynamical process of entanglement of the object's wave function with that of the environment. ′′ , responsible for decoherence, are "irrelevant" in being uncontrollable (or thermal), as is usually the case. Since the whole superposition is here assumed to "exist" forever (and may have consequences in principle), the branching is meaningful only with respect to a local observer.
The "Heisenberg cut" between observer and observed has often been claimed to be quite arbitrary. This cut represents the borderline at which the probability interpretation for the occurrence of events is applied. However, shifting it too far into the microscopic realm would miss the readily observed quantum aspects of certain large systems (SQUIDs etc.), while placing it beyond the detector would require the latter's decoherence to be taken into account anyhow. As pointed out by John Bell (1981) , the cut has to be placed "far enough" from the measured object in order to ensure that our limited capabilities of investigation (such as those of keeping the measured system isolated) prevent us from discovering any inconsistencies with the assumed classical properties or a collapse.
As noticed quite early in the historical debate, the cut may even be placed deep into the human observer, whose consciousness, which seems to be located in the cerebral cortex, may represent the final link in the observational chain (at least from his subjective point of view). This can be seen in early formulations by Heisenberg, it was favored by von Neumann, later discussed by London and Bauer (1939) , and again supported by Wigner (1962) , among others. It has even been interpreted as an objective influence of consciousness on physical reality (e.g. Wigner l.c.) , although it may be consistent with the formalism only when used with respect to one final observer, that is, in a strictly subjective (though partly objectivizable) sense (Zeh 1971) .
The "indivisible chain between observer and observed" is physically represented by a complex interacting medium, or a chain of intermediate systems |χ (i) , in quantum mechanical terms symbolically written as
instead of the simplified form (2.2). This chain is thus assumed to act dynamically step by step (cf. Zeh 1973) . If a superposition of such product states is now caused by an initial superposition of the observed system (as in ( 2.3)), we know empirically only that a collapse must be taken into account before (or when) the information arrives at the final link (the conscious observer). If there are several chains connecting observer and observed (for example via other observers, known as "Wigner's friends"), the Schrödinger equation confirms that each individual component (2.4) describes "consistent" (or objectivized, that is, in all chains the same) measurement results. From the subjective point of view of the final observer, all intermediate systems ("Wigner's friends" or "Schrödinger's cats") could well remain in a superposition of drastically different situations (including the environment) until he observes (or communicates with) them! Environment-induced decoherence means that an avalanche of other causal chains unavoidably branch off from the intermediate links of the chain as soon as they have become macroscopic (see Chap. 3). This might even trigger a real collapse process (to be described by hypothetical dynamical terms), since the many-particle correlations arising from decoherence would render the total system prone to such as yet unobserved, but nevertheless conceivable, non-linear many-particle forces (Pearle 1976 , Diósi 1985 , Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber 1986 , Tessieri, Vitali, and Grigolini 1995 see also Chap. 8) . Decoherence by a microscopic environment has been confirmed experimentally to be reversible in what is now often referred to as "quantum erasure" of a measurement (see Herzog et al. 1995) . In analogy to the concept of particle creation, such a microscopic environment may be said to describe "virtual decoherence". "Real" decoherence, which gives rise to the familiar classical appearance of the macroscopic world, is instead characterized by its unavoidability and irreversibility in practice.
In an important contribution, Tegmark (2000) has recently shown that neuronal and other processes in the brain are quasi-classical, too, because of envi-ronmental decoherence. (This is indeed assumed in most neuronal models.) This seems to imply that all objective aspects of human thinking and behavior can be described by such classical (though not necessarily deterministic) models. Since no precise "localization of consciousness" has been discovered yet, the neural network (just like the retina, say) may still be part of the "external world" to the unknown ultimate observer system (Zeh 1979) . However, because of Tegmarks arguments this problem may not affect an objective theory of observation any longer.
Even "real" decoherence must be distinguished from a genuine collapse, which is defined as the disappearance of all but one components from reality (thus representing a fundamental irreversibility).
6 As pointed out above, a collapse could well occur much later in the observational chain than decoherence, and possibly remain less fine-grained. Nonetheless, it should then be detectable in other situations if its dynamical rules are defined. Environment-induced decoherence (the dynamically arising strong correlations with the rest of the world) leads to the important consequence that, in a world with no more than few-particle forces, robust factor states χ In order to represent a subjective observer, a physical system must be in a definite state with respect to properties of which the observer is aware. The salvation of a psycho-physical parallelism of this kind was von Neumann's main argument for the introduction of his "first intervention" (2.1b): the collapse. As a consequence of the above-discussed dynamical independence of the different individual components of type (2.4) in their superposition, one may instead associate all arising factor wave functions ψ obs n (different ones in each component) with separate subjective observers (that is, with different states of consciousness). This is essentially Everett's "relative state interpretation" (so called, since the worlds observed by these observer states are described by their corresponding relative factor states). Although also called a "many worlds interpretation", it describes one quantum universe. Because of its (essential and non-trivial) reference to conscious observers, it may more appropriately be called a "multi-consciousness" or "many minds interpretation" , 1971 , Albert and Loewer 1988 , Lockwood 1989 , Squires 1990 , Stapp 1993 , Donald 1995 , Page 1995 . 6 Proposed mechanisms involving event horizons (Hawking 1987, Ellis, Mohanty and Nanopoulos 1989) would either require a fundamental violation of unitarity, or merely represent a specific kind of decoherence (entanglement beyond the horizon). The most immediate consequence of quantum entanglement is that quantum theory can only be consistently applied to the whole universe. 7 As Bell (1981) pointed out, Bohm's theory would require consciousness to be psychophysically coupled to certain of its classical variables (which it postulates to exist). These variables are probabilistically related to the wave function by means of a conserved statistical initial condition. Thus one may take the view that the "many minds interpretation" merely eliminates Bohm's unobservable and therefore meaningless intermediary classical variables and their trajectories from this psycho-physical connection. This is possible because of the dynamical autonomy of a wave function that evolves according to a universal Schrödinger equation, independently of Bohm's
Because of their dynamical independence, all these different observers (or rather different "versions" of the same observer) cannot find out by means of experiments whether or not the other components have survived. This consequence of the Schrödinger equation thus leads to the impression (for separate observers) that all "other" components have "hurried out of existence" as soon as decoherence has become irreversible for all practical purposes. Then it remains a pure matter of taste whether Occam's razor is applied to the wave function (by adding appropriate but not directly detectable collapse-producing nonlinear terms to its dynamical law), or to the dynamical law (by adding myriads of unobservable Everett components to our observed "reality"). Traditionally (and mostly successfully), consistency of the law has been ranked higher than simplicity of the facts.
Fortunately, the dynamics of decoherence can be discussed without giving an answer to this question. A collapse (real or apparent) has to be taken into account regardless of its interpretation in order to describe the dynamics of that wave function which represents our observed quasi-classical world (the time-dependent component which contains "our" observer states χ obs n ). Only specific dynamical collapse models could be confirmed or ruled out by experiments, while Everett's relative states depend in principle on the definition of the observer system.
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(No other systems have to be specified for fundamental reasons. Their density matrices, which describe decoherence and quasi-classical concepts, are merely convenient.)
In contrast to Bohm's or stochastic collapse theories, nothing has been said yet (or postulated) about probabilities of measurement outcomes. For this purpose, the Everett branches have to be given statistical weights in a way that appears ad hoc again. However, these probabilities are meaningful to an observer only as frequencies in series of equivalent measurements. These series must be performed in his branch (and would in general be performed with different results in other branches). Graham (1970) was able to show that the norm of the superposition of all those Everett branches (arising from such series of measurements) which show frequencies that substantially differ from the empirical and axiomatized quantum probabilities vanishes in the limit of infinite series. Although the definition of the norm, used in this argument, is equivalent to these probabilties, it can be selected against other possible definitions of a norm by its unique property of being conserved under the Schrödinger dynamics.
classical variables. These variables would then not, by themselves, carry memories of their "surrealistic" history. Memory must be in the quasi-classical wave packet that effectively guides them, while the other myriads of "empty" Everett world components (criticized for being "extravagant" by Bell) exist as well in Bohm's model. In his theory of timelessness, Barbour (1994 Barbour ( , 1999 effectively proposed a static version of Bohm's theory, which eliminates the latter's formal classical trajectories even though it restores a concept of memories ("time capsules" -see also Chapt. 6 of Zeh 2001). 8 Another aspect of this observer-relatedness of the observed world is the concept of a presence, which is not part of physical time. It reflects the empirical fact that the subjective observer is local in space and time.
To give an example: an isolated unstable quantum system may be described as a superposition of a metastable initial state and products of states of all outgoing decay fragments in each chanel. In a large but finite region of space and time it may then approximately decay exponentially and coherently according to the Schrödinger equation (with very small large-time deviations from exponential behavior caused by the dispersion of the distant outgoing waves). For a system that decays by emitting photons into a reflecting cavity, such a superposition of different decay times has in fact been confirmed in the form of coherent "state vector revival" (Rempe, Walther and Klein 1987) . An even more complex experiment exhibiting coherent state vector revival with weakly interacting objects was performed by using spin waves (Rhim, Pines and Waugh 1971) . In general, however, the decay fragments would soon be "monitored" by surrounding matter. The resulting state of the environment must then depend (contain "information") on the decay time, and the superposition will decohere into dynamically independent components corresponding to different (approximately defined) decay times. From the point of view of a local observer, the system may be assumed to have decayed at a certain time (within the usually very narrow limits set by the decoherence time scale -see Sect. 3.3.2), even though he need not have observed the decay. This situation does not allow coherent state vector revival any more. Instead it leads to an essentially exact exponential decay law, valid shortly after the decaying state was produced (see Joos 1984) .
However, as long as the information has not yet reached the observer, 5) he could as well assume (from his subjective point of view) that the nonlocal superposition still exists. According to the formalism, Schrödinger's cat (represented by χ (2) , say) would then "become" dead or alive only when he becomes aware of it. On the other hand, the property described by the state |ψ system n (just as the cat's status of being dead or alive, χ (2) n ) can be assumed to have become "real" as soon as decoherence has become irreversible. Therefore, decoherence must also destroy (that is, delocalize) any entanglement that gives rise to the violation of Bell's inequalities (as it does -see Venugopalan, Kumar and Gosh 1995) . If, instead of taking notice of the result, the observer would decide to perform another measurement of the "system" (by using a new observational chain), he could not observe any interference between different n's, since, as a local system, he cannot perform the required global measurements. All predictions which this observer can check are then consistent with the assumption that the system was in one of the states |ψ system n (with probability |c n | 2 ) before the second measurement (see also Sect. 2.4). This justifies the interpretation that the cat is determined to die or not yet to die as soon as decoherence has occurred somewhere in the chain (which will in general be the case before the poison is applied).
Density Matrix, Coarse Graining, and "Events"
The theory of decoherence uses some (more or less technical) auxiliary concepts. Their physical meaning will be recalled and discussed in this section, as it is essential for a correct interpretation of what is actually achieved with this theory.
In classical statistical mechanics, incomplete knowledge about the state of a system is described by means of an "ensemble" of states, that is, by a probability distribution ρ(p, q) on phase space -in Fig. 2 .1 indicated by an area of uniform probability. Mean values of state functions a(p, q) (that is, physical quantities that are determined by the state p,q), defined with respect to this ensemble, are then given by the expression dp dq ρ(p, q)a(p, q). The ensemble ρ(p, q) itself could be recovered from the mean values of a complete set of state functions (such as all δ-functions), while a (smaller) set that may be realizable in practice determines only a "coarse-grained" probability distribution.
If all states which form such an ensemble are assumed to obey the same Hamiltonian equations, their probability distribution ρ evolves according to the Liouville equation, ∂ρ ∂t = {H , ρ} , (2.6)
with Hamiltonian H and Poisson bracket {, }. However, this assumption would be highly unrealistic for a many-particle system. Even if the fundamental dynamics is assumed to be known exactly, the effective Hamiltonian for the considered system depends very sensitively on the state of the "environment", which cannot be assumed to be known better than that of the system itself. Borel (1914) showed long ago that even the gravitational effect resulting from shifting a small rock at a distance of Sirius by a few centimetres would completely change the microscopic state of a gas in a vessel here on earth within seconds after the retarded field has arrived (see also Chap. 3). In a similar connection, Ernst Mach spoke of the "profound interconnectedness of things". This surprising result is facilitated by the enormous amplification of the tiny differences in the molecular trajectories, caused by the different forces, during subsequent collisions with other molecules (each time by a factor of the order of the ratio of the mean free path over the molecular radius). Similarly, microscopic differences in the state of the gas will immediately disturb its environment, thus leading in turn to slightly different effective Hamiltonians for the gas, with in general grossly different ("chaotic") effects on the microscopic states of the original ensemble. This will induce strong statistical correlations of the gas with its environment, whose neglect would dynamically lead to an increase of ensemble entropy. This effective local dynamical indeterminism can be successfully taken into account (when calculating forward in time) by means of stochastic forces (using a Langevin equation) for the individual state, or by means of a corresponding "master equation" for an ensemble of states, ρ(p, q). The increase of the local ensemble entropy is thus attributed to an uncertain effective Hamiltonian. In this way, statistical correlations with the environment are regarded as dynamically irrelevant for the future evolution. An example is Boltzmann's collision equation (where the arising irrelevant correlations are intrinsic to the gas, however). The justification of this time-asymmetric procedure forms a basic problem of physics and cosmology (Zeh 2001) .
When appying the conventional quantization rules to the Liouville equation (2.6) in a formal way, one obtains the von Neumann equation (or quantum Liouville equation) ,
for the dynamics of "statistical operators" or "density operators" ρ. Similarly, expectation values A = tr(Aρ)/ tr(ρ) of observables A formally replace mean valuesā = dp dq a(p, q)ρ(p, q) of state functions a(p, q). Expectation values of a restricted set of observables would again represent a generalized coarse graining for the density operators. The von Neumann equation (2.7) is an unrealistic assumption for similar reasons as explained for the Liouville equation, although quantitative differences may arise from gaps in the energy spectra -mainly at low energies. Discrete quantum spectra have practical consequences for macroscopic systems only in such exceptional cases, while they may in general prevent rigorous proofs of ergodic or chaos theorems. However, whenever quantum correlations do form in analogy to classical correlations (as is the rule), they lead to far more profound consequences than their classical counterparts. In order to explain these differences, the concept of a density matrix has to be derived from that of a wave function instead of being formally introduced. According to Sect. 2.2, the probability for a pure state |n to be found in a state |α in a corresponding measurement is given by | n | α | 2 . Its mean probability in an ensemble of states {|α , p α }, with probabilities p α representing incomplete information about the initial state α, is, therefore, p n = p α | n | α | 2 = tr{ρP n }, where ρ = |α p α α| and P n = |n n|. This result remains true for general observables A = a n P n in place of P n . The ensemble of wave functions |α , which thus defines a density matrix, need not consist of mutually orthogonal states, although the density matrix can always be diagonalized in terms of its eigenbasis. Its representation by a general ensemble of states is therefore far from unique -in contrast to a classical probability distribution. Nonetheless, the density matrix can still be shown to obey a von Neumann equation if all states contained in the ensemble are assumed to evolve according to the same unique Hamiltonian.
However, the fundamental nonlocality of quantum states means that the state of a local system does not exist in general; it is not merely unknown. Accordingly, there is no effective local Hamiltonian that would allow (2.7) to apply in principle (see Kübler and Zeh 1973) . This is easily overlooked when the density matrix is introduced axiomatically and in analogy to a classical probability distribution on phase space.
Quantum nonlocality means that the generic state of a composite system ("system" and environment, say),
does not factorize. The expectation values of all local observables,
have then to be calculated by "tracing out" the environment,
Here, the density matrix ρ system , which in general has nonzero entropy even for a pure (completely defined) global state |Ψ , is given by
It represents the specific coarse-graining with respect to all subsystem observables only. This "reduced density matrix" can be formally represented by various ensembles (including its eigenrepresentation or diagonal form), although it does here (incompletely) describe one pure and entangled global state. A density matrix thus based on entanglement has been called an "improper mixture" by d 'Espagnat (1966) . This improper mixture can evidently not explain ensembles of definite measurement outcomes and their probabilities. Regardless of its origin and interpretation, the density matrix can also be represented by its partial Fourier transform, known as the Wigner function (see Sect. 3.2.3),
The second line is here written in analogy to the Bloch vector, π i = trace{σ i ρ}, since
is a generalization of the Pauli matrices (with 'vector' index p, q instead of i = 1, 2, 3 -see Sect. 4.4 of Zeh 2001). While formally analogous to a phase space distribution, the Wigner function does evidently not represent one. This may also be seen from its potentially negative values, while even a Gaussian wave packet, which leaves the Wigner function everywhere positive, is a perfectly coherent individual quantum state. The degree of entanglement represented by an improper mixture (2.11) is conveniently measured by the latter's formal entropy, such as the linear entropy S lin = tr(ρ − ρ 2 ). In a "bipartite system", for example, the mutual entanglement of its two parts may be controlled and used in specific applications (such as EPR/Bell type experiments, quantum cryptography, or teleportation). However, this is possible only in as far as it is not obscured by a mixed state of the total bipartite system. Therefore, other measures have been proposed to describe the operationally available entanglement (Peres 1996 , Vedral et al. 1997 . Such measures may be misleading from a fundamental point of view, as the mixed total state, which reduces the usability of entanglement, is either itself based on entanglement (of the bipartite system with its environment), or merely the consequence of averaging over an ensemble of unknown (but nonetheless entangled) states.
The eigenbasis of the reduced density matrix can be used, together with that for the environment, to write the total state as a single sum (the "Schmidt representation" -Schmidt 1907 , Schrödinger 1935 , Zeh 1971 ,
These two orthogonal systemsφ k are here determined (up to degeneracy) by the total state |Ψ itself. The latter's time dependence must therefore affect both the Schmidt states and the (formal) probabilities p k (see Kübler and Zeh 1973 , Pearle 1979 , Albrecht 1993 . In particular, the subsystem entropy and even the number of non-vanishing Schmidt components change dynamically -and so does the subsystem entropy
The reason is that the induced dynamics of the subsystems is in general not "autonomous". Similar to the motion of a shadow that reflects that of a physical object, the reduced information content of the coarse-grained density matrix is insufficient to determine its change. For similar reasons, Boltzmann had to introduce his Stoßzahlansatz (based on statistical assumptions) when neglecting statistical correlations between particles. The exact dynamics of any local "system" would in general require the whole Universe to be taken into account.
In analogy to the Boltzmann equation, effective "open systems quantum dynamics" has indeed often been postulated by means of semigroups or master equations, used to calculate forward in time. An equivalent formalism was introduced by Feynman and Vernon (1963) by means of path integrals. As explained above, these descriptions can neither be exact, nor would they justify the replacement of improper mixtures by proper ones unless explicitly postulated as fundamental corrections to the Schrödinger equation. The theory of master equations is discussed in a formal way in Chap. 7 (see also Zeh 2001) . Their justification for local systems in terms of a global unitary Schrödinger equation requires very specific (statistically improbable) cosmic initial conditions. According to a universal Schrödinger equation, quantum correlations with the environment are thus permanently created with great efficiency for all macroscopic systems, leading to decoherence: the dislocalization of certain phase relations (see Chap. 3 for many applications). The apparent (or "improper") ensembles, obtained for the subsystems in this way, have often led to claims that decoherence be able (or meant) to solve the measurement problem.
9 The apparent nature of these ensembles has then in turn been used to declare the program 9 In the Schmidt basis, interference terms are exactly absent by definition. This representation has therefore also been used in an attempt to specify the Everett branching precisely, that is, to define the ultimate "pointer basis" |χ observer n (cf. Zeh 1973, of decoherence a failure. As explained in Sect. 2.3, both claims miss the point. However, decoherence represents an essential dynamical step in the measurement process. The rest may remain an epistemological problem (requiring only a reformulation of the psycho-physical parallelism in quantum mechanical terms). If the Schrödinger equation is indeed exact, the observed quantum indeterminism must reflect that of the observer's identity -not one to be found in the dynamics of Nature. The process of decoherence leads to a new dynamical course graining. If phase relations between certain subspaces of the subsystem permanently disappear by decoherence, the reduced density matrix may be approximated in the form ρ = m,n P m ρP n ≈ n P n ρP n , (2.14)
where P n projects on the n-th decohered subspace, while P n = 1l. The dynamics of the formal probabilities p n (t) := tr{P n ρ(t)} may be described by a master equation that is similar to the Pauli equation, 15) as was shown by Joos (1984) . Since (2.15) describes stochastic subsystem dynamics (in the direction of time that is characterized by the process of decoherence), it defines probabilities for apparent coarse-grained "histories" n(t), corresponding to time-ordered sequences of projections P n1 (t 1 ) . . . P n k (t k ). Probabilities for such histories in discrete time steps are then given by p(n 1 , . . . , n k ) = tr{P n k (t k ) . . . P n1 (t 1 )ρ(t 0 )} (2.16) (using of the property P 2 = P of projection operators). States n k dynamically arising according to master equations may contain "memories" ("time capsules" in Barbour's words), while the corresponding histories appear "quasi-classical". Such apparent trajectories, which are based on their robustness against decoherence, may be dynamically described by stochastic quantum Langevin equations, for example those which have been proposed to describe real quantum trajectories by Diósi (1986) , Belavkin (1988) , or Gisin and Percival (1992) -see Diósi and Kiefer (2001) .
In the "consistent histories" approach (Griffiths 1984 , Omnès 1992 , formal projections P n are called "events" regardless of any dynamical decoherence. These events are thus not dynamically described by the theory. This is related to the Copenhagen interpretation, where events are assumed to occur "out of the blue" or "outside the laws of nature". However, only those histories n 1 , . . . n k are then admitted by postulate (that is, assumed to "occur") which possess "consistent" probabilities -defined by their compatibility with a master Albrecht 1992 , Barvinsky and Kamenshchik 1995 . A similar assumption is formally used for all systems in the "modal interpretation" of quantum mechanics (cf. Dieks 1995) . equation (2.15). This condition requires (a weak form of) decoherence, which is not generally based on entanglement in this theory (cf. Omnès 1999) . This dynamical dilemma is then resolved by Griffiths and Omnès by introducing a "new logic". It culminates in Omnès' (1995) surprising remark that "the formalism of logic is not time-reversal invariant, as can be seen in the time ordering of the (projection) operators". However, a property a at time t 1 that is said to "imply" a property b at time t 2 > t 1 would describe a causal (that is, dynamical) rather than a logical relationship. This conceptual confusion of cause and reason seems to have a long tradition in philosophy, while even in mathematics the validity of logical theorems is often inappropriately defined by means of logical operations that are performed in a one-dimensional order (thus mimicking a causal relation in time).
In the theory of decoherence, apparent events in the detector are described dynamically by a universal Schrödinger equation, using certain initial conditions. Precisely these apparent events are observed. This can hardly be an accident (see Sect. 2.3)! The observed and apparently discontinuous events are thus successfully described by fast but smooth interaction processes which lead to entanglement. In a similar way, apparent "particles" (local microscopic objects) were described in terms of wave functions by means of decoherence occurring in the detector. This identification of observed events with a decoherence process holds regardless of any conceivable subsequent real collapse. Decoherence is, therefore, not only responsible for the classical aspects of quantum theory, but also for its "quantum" aspects (see Sect. 3.3.2.3). All fundamental physical concepts are wave-like, based on "smooth" Schrödinger dynamics.
This interpretation of quantum events also avoids any "superluminal effects" that have been shown (with mathematical rigour -see Hegerfeldt 1994 ) to arise (not very surprisingly) from explicitly or tacitly assumed instantaneous quantum jumps between exact energy or particle number eigenstates.
10 The latter possess infinite exponential tails that can never form in relativistic reality. Supporters of explicit collapse mechanisms are quite aware of this problem, and try to avoid it (cf. Diósi and Lukácz 1994 and Chap. 8) . In the nonlocal quantum formalism, dynamical locality is achieved by using Hamiltonian operators that are spatial integrals over a Hamiltonian density. This form prevents superluminal signalling and the like.
10 Superluminal phenomena predicted in this way may be regarded as modern versions of the story of Der Hase und der Igel (the race between The Hedgehog and the Rabbit), narrated by the Grimm brothers. Here, the hedgehog, as a competitor in the race, does not run at all, while his wife is waiting at the end of the furrow, shouting in low German "Ick bin all hier!" ("I'm already here!"). Similar arguments hold for "quantum teleportation", where nothing is ported in the Schrödinger picture. Experiments clearly support the view that reality is described by a smoothly evolving wave function, compatible with relativity, rather than in terms of probabilistic "events" (see Fearn, Cock, and Milonni 1995) . Teleportation would be required to describe the experiments if physical properties entered existence "out of the blue" in measurement-like events.
